A Response To "39 questions about the war in Ukraine"

Considering considerations

No fancy thumbnail either.

Disclaimer: this is not legal advice, consult with a legal professional.

Edward Slavsquat posted this article titled, “39 questions about the war in Ukraine”.

Excuse the terrible formatting and lack of references.

This was originally intended to be simply an in-depth comment answering the questions with nuance, but Substack then slapped the response on the wrist and said “type a shorter comment”, without specifying a character length. How short exactly, Substack?

Given it’s not exactly cricket to brute force flood someone’s comment section trying to work out how long a given comment can be, figured best to convert it into a Substack article. To avoid annoying readers, this article won’t be emailed.

A Response

Dear Mr Slavquat,

As a writer of the multi-part in-depth 'The History Between Ukraine and Russia' series, permit me to be 'advocate of the other side' and attempt to answer the 39 questions, not to defend the Sputnik V poisoners, but to give the debate depth rather than 'grr, bad guy bad'.

It seems people aren't entirely familiar with the details and it's not as simple as 'why not just do X'. [Readers: For brevity, the (lengthy) questions are omitted and can be referenced from Slavsquat’s article here.]

1) Crimea was "taken" by referendum; Crimea held their referendum before Russia's military turned up. In the "fighting", only 3 people were killed. ~16,000 Ukrainian troops defected and were employed by the Russian army. Ukraine did not send reinforcements because it was evident Ukraine were not popular there.

By this same vein, then, Russia seems to have naively hoped to achieve the same — relatively bloodless — thing in the Donbass, hence their constant references to referendums, and popular local support. Minsk I and Minsk II were possible delays in the hope Ukraine would do to Donbass what they did to Crimea. After all, why invade Donbass if referendum was sufficient for Crimea?

2) Can't fully answer, but most likely by Azov, who were operating in those regions armed. They ignored orders to disarm - even from Zelensky as late as 2019. They retained weapons and worked like a militia. Seeing Zelensky as Jewish, they saw him as an illegitimate leader, and ergo not of the authority to order them to disarm, especially in the face of what they perceived to be 'Russian-Jewish gangsters'.

However I think your point was; why didn't Russia do more to support them? Russia were hoping for a Crimea situation, however, Crimea is a well defined island, Donbass is an open-land area, and where support ends or begins is not easy to delineate. There were pockets of pro-Ukrainians within Donbass.

3) Again, I think Russia wanted the bloodless outcome of Crimea. The truth was Russia were negotiating with powerless parties (Ukraine included), as the real power lay with the US, who wasn't party. Only the EU agreed to Minsk, but the problem was Azov were financed by and supplied weapons via the US (John McCain even physically attended in, I believe, 2015 to air support directly to Azov).

Azov were not under the control of the Ukrainian President, were not financed, equipped or supplied troops by Ukraine, and the EU had little to no involvement in any of this. You might ask 'why didn't the Ukrainian president just imprison them all?'.

But as you know Western Ukraine - the majority chunk - have popular support for the Banderists in Ukraine. They could piss on the Ukrainian president and get away with it, knowing the public would ouster any president who resisted. Zelensky insulted them on TV and his approval ratings sharply dropped, to which he was forced to apologise. Azov's militia ignited the fuse.

4) A lot of differing questions, so I'll try to address the fundamental points: Russia gave LPR/DPR military advisors as they didn't want to spark a massive bloody war with the EU or US. The idea being if they taught them how to fight by themselves, they could drive out the Azov militia and gain control for themselves (then Russia could waltz in, be declared the winner all without expending a single Russian troop). The fixed fronts were likely to avoid overstepping into pro-Ukrainian areas by leaving a safe margin, but that's speculation on my point.

5) Is answered by 4. Russia were very keen to have LPR/DPR's accession to join Russia seen as 'legitimate'. If they flooded in weapons, the US/EU would accuse of a military takeover by proxy, which in turn would violate Minsk and justify greater threat escalation (so it wouldn't just be Azov militants attacking LPR/DPR, but the rest of the Ukrainian armed forces too). One of those 'obvious in hindsight' situations.

6) Same reason the US has no ammunition, no manufacturing capabilities, being forced to outsource to South Korea and Canada their supplies, etc: globalism. That, and Russia haven't been in a cold war-like mentality since it caused the Soviet collapse in 1991 (which was driven by too much military spending).

Your point is probably more: 'why didn't Russia prepare for Ukrainian invasion', but remember it wasn't: Azov started to rapidly build up a planned offensive to forcefully take back LPR/DPR, Russia's offence was to pre-empt what would have been a slaughter of the under-equipped LPR/DPR members by Azov artillery strike. Your question ought to be: 'why did Russia not consider Ukrainian assault a possibility?'

7) Speculative from me, but I would blame Russia relying on 'Open Source Intel' (OSINT) on Social Media. People mistake the vocal minority as representing the silent majority. Russia only had true popularity in Donbass at best, and even then, there was patchwork support for Ukraine (hence the Azov holdouts and "forts"). If they had studied history they'd know no-one west of the Dniper river would have supported them, having been historically part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (and therefore arguably a separate demographic). The Communists slaughtered the few Russian-friendly Cossacks a century ago.

8) Russia has always been pro-loyalist in governance. Popular support would imply democracy, and Russia have seen what democracy results in for the US (mutilation of kids, paedophiles in power, etc). Not justifying their approach, for the record, just pointing out how they operate.

9) SMO was started in response to a build up of artillery by Azov militants who planned to bomb LPR/DPR back to the stone age. If Russia did nothing, there would be a massacre - of which Russia would be blamed for if they didn't intervene. If Russia did something, then there was a risk of war.

I imagine the rationale behind SMO was the plan of a 'limited campaign' to neutralise Azov militants (the 'denazification' Putin kept talking about), and then just simply leave. Hole up Ukrainian forces in Kiev, eliminate Azov militants, return home. That would have solved most problems given Ukraine had no control on Azov.

What Russia likely didn't expect was the flood (and presence) of CIA funded operatives and SpecOps from various NATO groups already operating in the country (there to train Ukrainian forces) to spearhead countermeasures against the arguably outdated tactics deployed by the Russians, by use of sophisticated equipment. Given the US has many bases in Europe they were likely able to quickly deploy additional resources and far more equipment than Russia was expecting (read: the US got involved far faster than Russia thought they would, leading to wider involvement).

With net mobilisation by Ukraine, it is no longer 'eliminate Azov' because Azov militants are no longer the problem; it has now transformed into the hulking mess of the entire Ukrainian military backed and financed by both Europe and US. Russia can't simply withdraw having killed Azov militants because now the Ukrainian military takes their place - they're proactively defending Azov. So now, SMO becomes a wider warfare campaign.

10) Actually, I'd argue to the contrary here. Russia did a good job of preparing for Sanctions post 2014. They created an independent internet (so domain name level blocks won't work), and they were already building up the SWIFT alternative to bypass banking sanctions.

If anything, I'd say they saw the sanctions coming. I can't comment if it has injured Russia as misleading EU outlets claim, not living there myself, but it does not appear to have had North Korean levels of starvation or Iranian levels of oil denial occur, and if anything, many countries are shifting away from the US orbit - Saudi Arabia and Brazil among them. BRICS, yes, but for SA to middle-finger the US (who often finance and equip them) is huge.

11) Can't answer this, not familiar: I will say it is probably because Russia realised the same as the US did: it is very difficult to re-import manufacturing base. It'll take the US 4 years to complete the 7nm CPU chip plant in Arizona... and 7nm is already quite dated. 3nm is the new in thing and 5nm is 'current'.

12) See answers to 11 and 6.

13) Answered by the fact Russia didn't anticipate sudden build up by Azov, and didn't anticipate SMO becoming a wider war due to US pre-involvement.

14) Likely because Syria etc have actual US soldiers and direct combatants with plenty of training involved, whilst Ukraine still has a mostly rushed civilian military where they drag people off the streets (read: matching like for like).

15) Can't answer this, probably a Russian-centric thing.

16) Private firms would contract people under civil contract law, which is only punishable by torts (read: monetary penalties). You'd need to be enlisted in a government/public military to fall under military law and be punished. Moral of the story: sign civil contracts, not military ones (and yes, mercenaries count as 'civil' contracts as it is paid voluntary employment).

17) You probably should write a direct appeal to the Russian President on that one. It may have something to do with Bulgaria protesting the EU and the war, and I think it is more so Russia can prevent the EU having 'uniformity'. Many EU laws require unanimous consent to pass, so keeping Bulgaria on-side to stop the full force of the EU may be more beneficial than the exploding fuel Ukraine receives (I imagine Russia anticipates Ukraine would just source the fuel from somewhere else regardless, maybe the long-suffering EU citizens?).

18) Grain deals are complex. And actually you'll have to blame me for that one, given I made the political appeals behind the scenes for it to be implemented. So, Russia and Ukraine are the largest grain exporters in the world (not producers, but exporters), making the world very dependent on both to maintain grain prices.

This means, if the grain deals involving Ukraine aren't made, the entire world suffers famine. So if you recall at the start of the war, food prices in the UK, EU, Africa, Middle-East and Asia *all* shot up for foods relating to grain-based products (wheat, sunflower seeds for sunflower oil, etc)?

That was because Ukraine was unable to export grain. Famines make countries desperate, and in desperation they can become violent, or they can become co-dependent (read: appeal to the US for aid in their food shortage). This isn't a case of 'Russia becomes the next newest supplier', because Russian grain exports are *already at capacity*, that is to say, Russia cannot produce more grain.

And non-Ukraine countries can't produce grain due to the fertiliser shortage (due to the EU embargoing natural gas from Russia which is used in the manufacture of hydrogen for use in producing ammonia based fertilisers). If Russia stopped the Ukraine grain deal, people across the world would literally start starving, driven out to unaffordable levels of food prices.

Ukraine doesn't exactly benefit from the deal, either: all of their grain is sold 'at cost' or at loss. Any profit they do derive isn't going to win them the war, especially not compared to the dwarfing sum of $206 or so billion from the US. It is pointless making the world suffer to deny Ukraine a few million in rubles when the US prints them billions.

And keeping the grain there doesn't benefit anyone; it would spoil due to a lack of capacity. In-fact, the grain being released aids Russia's allies in Africa and the Middle-East; food shortages could lead to protests and government fights. So there's a bigger strategem at play than 'OMG Ukraine'.

19) I concur with you on the fact he ought to be condemned. As for the prisoner swaps, it rescues Russians (and pro-Russian Ukrainians). The returned Azovites don't get a free pass: they will be returned to the front line where the odds are they will be killed. You might go 'wouldn't the same apply to Russians', but the current ratio is something like 7 Ukrainians for every 1 Russian. Also, it's a shitty aspect of war, but maintaining prisoner swaps allows for Britney Griner type situations.

20) Simulations by knowledgeable YouTubers(!!!) found that:

a) Even if Moskva had deployed radar (it hadn't, due to the flawed assumption Ukraine did not have anti-ship missiles), the waves due to windy conditions would have prevented the detection of the missiles

b) It occurred on a rainy day, also interfering with radar

c) The close-in systems were shown to be inadequate at shooting down the missiles

d) Even in 'best case' simulations (calm seas, radar active), the system could only shoot down one of the two missiles consistently, with a 50% rate of the missile hitting the target

e) It was observed whoever used the launcher used the nearest point and the best form of cover, and it is suspected it was done by US special forces, not casual Ukrainians as painted by media

21) I think you find in Sumy (likely a template for the others) that Russia held a referendum, and found the people there voted *against* Russian presence. Russia have learnt from the errors of the US war in Afghan and know there's no point "holding" a region where the public don't find you popular. I don't have the article to hand, but the mayor of, I think Sumy, bragged they 'defeated' the Russians by voting them out.

22) I don't have Russian intel but I can tell you what I've seen impacted:

a) Fuel depots

b) Manufacturing sectors/districts/plants

c) Storage sites (including civilian targets housing military equipment like that shopping mall with the artillery missile launcher)

d) Food storage facilities, but only ones relating to the military infrastructure

e) Substations (but largely not power plants)

f) Train lines and other logistic routes

g) Ukrainian soldiers, especially advancing troops or embedded ones

May be others.

23) Ukrainians use a patchwork system of comms. Smartphones via Starlink, short range radio, handheld receivers. The system isn't 'centralised', and to be honest, some of their comms 'leak' vital information to the Russians. Slava Z have reported many kills due to comms leak; why would the Russians destroy something giving them vital intel? As for Starlink, Elon Musk has reported attempts to jam, but they're satellites (look up 'Kessler effect' why they haven't been shot down), not ground based targets, and receivers are portable, not stationary.

24) Hitting nuclear plants directly would cause radiation pollution to fall on Russians. I think even you know why they wouldn't do this. As for why Ukraine was so fast: substation bypasses and assistance from the EU with replacement transformers.

25) Can't answer this.

26) Russia made clear their goal isn't to 'hold land' but to lose the fewest troops. Emphasis on troops, not equipment. So naturally they will retreat from areas that are unfavourable. In this case, Ukrainian artillery was gaining range (US HIMARS transfer, remember) and Russian supplies were further back. A better question to ask is 'why did Russia ignore the Russian commanders who felt confident they could easily hold territory?'.

27) Some questions already address above. For those leaving the military, likely an ironic lack of manpower to enforce military goals.

28) Political whims.

29) See 26.

30) I'd like to know this too.

31) Russia doesn't yet have governship over Ukraine (or whichever portions). Crimea already teaches in Russian.

32) Perhaps because Russia isn't doing a true offense. The problem is protecting pro-Russian people does not involve bombing the absolute shit out of their country. This isn't an American "liberation" approach ala Afghanistan.

33) Reserved for a much bigger fight later on. Even the US sends their Bradleys before they send their Abrams. Heck, the US sent Soviet-era equipment before they sent the Bradleys.

34) Good questions which Russian government ought to address.

35) To avoid all-out nuclear war. I think we all know it is coming, though.

36) Are you proposing the rest of the country experience hardship too? Or are you falsely equating civilian life far away from loud explosions and death, with that of a battlefield? Who lives happily on a battlefield?

37) They likely won't be, because the situation keeps changing. Saying 'eliminate Azov', eliminating Azov, and going 'yay we're done' as the Ukrainian army steamrolls LPR/DPR isn't exactly 'mission accomplished' (just ask George Bush on Iraq).

38) Russian government workers working for the Russian government likely know not to criticise the Russian government. Pro-loyalty appointments as mentioned earlier (then again, name any country that doesn't appoint pro-loyalty people into power?).

39) Can't answer. The fun of complex international diplomacy!

Hopefully this expands the debate. Forgive the lack of references (most are buried in the history articles and this was only supposed to be a ‘quick’ comment, not a referenced essay).

Yes, I am aware this will smell like ‘pro-Russia shilling’, but I’m pretty confident they wouldn’t admit to mistakes like the fact Moskva had their radar system undeployed or the fact Sputnik V is just as toxic as AstraZenca.

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